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Abstract: Epistemic permissivism is the view that it is possible for two people to rationally hold 
incompatible attitudes toward some proposition on the basis of one body of evidence. In this paper, 
I defend a particular version of permissivism – unacknowledged permissivism (UP) – which says 
that permissivism is true, but that no one can ever rationally believe that she is in a permissive 
case. I show that counter to what virtually all authors who have discussed UP claim, UP is an 
attractive view: it is compatible with the intuitive motivations for permissivism and avoids a 
significant challenge to permissivism: the arbitrariness objection. 
 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
According to basic permissivism about rationality, there can be cases in which two people come 
to different rational conclusions on the basis of the same evidence. More precisely, basic 
permissivism says that basic permissive cases are possible. 
 
basic permissive case: A case in which two people rationally hold incompatible doxastic 
attitudes towards some proposition P on the basis of a single body of evidence E.1  
 
Those who endorse permissivism agree that basic permissive cases can occur but differ with regard 
to whether acknowledged permissive cases are possible. Acknowledged permissive cases are cases 
in which two people rationally hold incompatible attitudes towards some proposition based on 
shared evidence, while believing that one another’s opinions are just as rational as their own.2 
The most popular versions of permissivism hold that acknowledged permissive cases can 
occur, and that in fact, they occur often. Call permissive views which allow for the existence of 
acknowledged permissive cases versions of acknowledged permissivism.3 Another possible type 
of permissivism holds that acknowledged permissive cases are not possible, and that every basic 
permissive case is an unacknowledged permissive case: a case in which two parties rationally hold 
incompatible attitudes towards some proposition on the basis of a single body of evidence, but 
neither party believes that the other party’s view is rational.  
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Unacknowledged permissive cases might count as unacknowledged for different reasons. 
For example, a permissive case could be unacknowledged in virtue of the fact that the parties 
involved are not aware of the disagreement—that is, they do not recognize that they have differing 
opinions about P. An example: two mathematicians working in different countries hold different 
views about whether some hypothesis is provable but are unaware of their disagreement because 
they have not come in contact with one another. Another way in which a permissive case could 
count as unacknowledged is if the parties to the disagreement recognize that they have different 
opinions about P, but fail to regard one another’s opinions about P as rational.4 A third way that a 
permissive case could be unacknowledged is if each of the participants is aware of the other party’s 
attitude towards P and believes that attitude to be rational, but is uncertain about their own attitude 
towards P. Call permissive views that hold that the only permissive cases are unacknowledged 
permissive cases versions of unacknowledged permissivism (UP for short).   
According to impermissivism about rationality, basic permissive cases, whether 
acknowledged or unacknowledged, are not possible.5  
Most authors who defend permissivism defend acknowledged permissivism.6 Likewise, 
most authors who argue against permissivism focus their criticisms on acknowledged 
permissivism.7 Unacknowledged permissivism is thought to be unmotivated, and therefore taken 
to be a coherent but unattractive option by most parties to the debate. 
The goal of this paper is to show that, contrary to what has been assumed, UP is a plausible 
view.  I begin by clarifying the thesis of unacknowledged permissivism by contrasting it with 
acknowledged permissivism (§2).  I then discuss the kind of cases that are often taken to provide 
intuitive support for permissivism, and to support acknowledged permissivism in particular. I show 
that these cases do not provide more support for acknowledged permissivism than they do for 
unacknowledged permissivism. I also suggest that there is some reason to be skeptical of whether 
our intuitions about these hypothetical cases really support even basic permissivism (§3). In §4, I 
show that UP avoids a significant theoretical challenge that plagues versions of acknowledged 
permissivism–namely, the challenge of instability, inconsistency, or arbitrariness. Thus, 
unacknowledged permissivism does not run afoul of our intuitions about permissivism (as it is 
often assumed to do) and is immune to the strongest objection in the literature against basic 
permissivism. Finally, in §5, I respond to two objections that have been raised against 
unacknowledged permissivism.   
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2 Acknowledged and Unacknowledged Permissivism 
 
In their helpful paper delineating different versions of permissivism and impermissivism, Kopec 
and Titelbaum  discuss a version of permissivism according to which ‘there exist cases where two 
agents have the same evidence and rationally come to conflicting assessments [of some proposition 
P], all the while being fully aware of the divergent rational assessments’ (2016, p. 191). They dub 
this view ‘acknowledged permissivism,’ and the kind of case just described an ‘acknowledged 
permissive case.’  
This characterization of an acknowledged permissive fails to specify what exactly needs to 
be acknowledged by the parties to the disagreement for their case to count as an acknowledged 
permissive case. In particular, the description leaves open whether each party must acknowledge 
the rationality of the other’s party’s attitude towards P, or simply the fact that the other party has 
a different attitude towards P. The nomenclature (acknowledged permissivism) suggests that 
Kopec and Titelbaum have the former variation in mind: what is acknowledged by each party is 
that both the attitude held towards P by the other party and their own attitude toward P are rational. 
That is, an acknowledged permissive case is as follows: 
 
acknowledged permissive case: A case in which two people rationally hold incompatible 
doxastic attitudes towards P on the basis of a single body of evidence E, and in which each 
person believes that the other party’s attitude is rational. 
 
Acknowledged permissivism is the view that acknowledged permissive cases are possible. But it’s 
possible to have a permissive view about rationality even if you find the existence of acknowledged 
permissive cases implausible. Such a view would affirm the existence of basic permissive cases, 
while denying the possibility of acknowledged permissive cases. According to this version of 
permissivism, every basic permissive case is also necessarily a case in which rational participants 
fail to see an attitude towards P other than their own as rational, perhaps even in spite of their most 
charitable attempts. Call the view that holds that basic permissive cases exist, but acknowledged 
permissive cases do not, unacknowledged permissivism (UP). UP is the view that the only 
permissive cases that exist are unacknowledged permissive cases: 
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unacknowledged permissive case: A case in which two parties rationally hold incompatible 
attitudes towards P on the basis of a single body of evidence E, but neither party believes 
that the attitude of the other party is rational.8   
 
According to unacknowledged permissivism, individuals who have reached rational, incompatible 
conclusions on the basis of shared evidence cannot at the same time rationally regard one another’s 
views as rational. UP says you can be in a basic permissive case only if you don’t believe that 
you’re in one.9 If, in such a situation, you do come to believe that the case you’re in is permissive, 
your overall doxastic state is no longer rational. White describes such a position as the view that 
‘permissivism is true but epistemically destructive if known’ (2005, p. 450).10  
UP entails both that (i) there are possible cases in which evidence E rationalizes belief that 
P and belief that not-P; and (ii) that it is not rational for a subject who is in such a case to believe 
P on the basis of E while simultaneously judging that a belief that not-P on the basis of E is rational. 
Thus, UP posits that permissive cases exist, but necessarily involve what Sorensen (1988) refers 
to as a ‘belief blindspot’ for any subject who is in a permissive case. According to Sorensen, a 
belief blindspot is a proposition that may be true, but cannot be rationally believed by a subject.11 
While UP is a coherent position in the theoretical space of options, it is usually thought to 
be an overall unattractive view. One alleged problem with the view is that it breaks ties with the 
core motivation for defending permissivism in the first place–namely, the intuition that there are 
plenty of ordinary and easily identifiable cases in which rational disagreement can occur. 
Unacknowledged permissivism cannot accommodate this intuition because it entails that 
rationality forbids participants in a permissive case from seeing their disagreement as a rational 
one.12 Schoenfield, for example, writes:  
 
[UP] is a very implausible view and accepting it requires giving up on some of the 
considerations that motivate permissivism in the first place. (2014, footnote 31) 
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And White writes: 
 
While [UP] may be coherent and escape the objections thus far, I doubt that anyone 
holds such a view, as it is hard to see what could motivate it. (2005, p. 451) 
 
As I will argue in §3, however, the thought that unacknowledged permissivism fails to fulfill our 
intuitions about permissive cases is mistaken: UP fulfills these intuitions as well as acknowledged 
permissivism does.  
Another complaint against unacknowledged permissivism is that the view has the unusual 
implication that, whenever one comes to correctly believe that one is in a basic permissive case 
with regard to some proposition P, one’s original (rational) attitude towards P ceases to be rational. 
This seems problematic because, as White puts it, it is ‘natural to suppose that a belief can always 
rationally survive learning the epistemic value of one’s evidence. That is, if it is rational to believe 
P given evidence E, then it is rational to believe P given E and E’, where E’ correctly states what 
attitudes towards P are rationally permissible given E’ (2005, p. 450).  
A final objection to unacknowledged permissivism is that it suggests that it is impossible 
to identify a permissive case, even from an observer’s or third-person perspective. (The details of 
this argument will be elaborated in §5.) But if there are no identifiable permissive cases, this seems 
like a problem for the view: why should we believe permissivism is correct if we can never identify 
a permissive cases?  
So, permissive epistemologies that do not allow for acknowledged permissive cases, it is 
argued, are intuitively implausible, and suffer from other problems. As I’ll argue, though, there are 
good reasons for thinking that these objections to unacknowledged permissivism cannot be 
sustained. In the next section, I turn to the allegation that unacknowledged permissivism breaks 
ties with the intuitive motivations for permissivism.  
 
3 The Intuitive Motivations for Permissivism 
 
The intuition that rational disagreement is possible is among the major motivations cited for basic 
permissivism. Here is Rosen (2001), often referenced in discussions of the intuitive motivation for 
permissivism:  
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It should be obvious that reasonable people can disagree, even when confronted with a single 
body of evidence. When a jury or a court is divided in a difficult case, the mere fact of 
disagreement does not mean that someone is being unreasonable. Paleontologists disagree 
about what killed the dinosaurs. And while it is possible that most of the parties to this 
dispute are irrational, this need not be the case. To the contrary, it would appear to be a fact 
of epistemic life that a careful review of the evidence does not guarantee consensus, even 
among thoughtful and otherwise rational investigators (2001, pp. 71–72).  
 
Here, Rosen asserts the rationality of diverging opinions in two domains: courts of law, and 
scientific inquiry. And it is quite common to see similar appeals to the permissibility of rational 
disagreement in other domains, too. Schoenfield, immediately after quoting part of the above 
passage from Rosen, remarks that ‘it is not just in scientific contexts in which it seems that people 
can reasonably arrive at different conclusions on the basis of the same body of evidence.’ In other 
domains, such as medicine and religion, she suggests that people might reasonably disagree on the 
basis of the same evidence; for example, about the efficacy of acupuncture, or the existence of 
God (2014, p.196). 
Adding to the list of domains in which permissivism seems to many intuitively correct, we 
see Peter van Inwagen appealing to the intuition that rational disagreement in philosophical matters 
is possible a decade before the debate over permissivism gained steam:  
 
Whatever the reason, it must be possible for one to be justified in accepting a philosophical 
thesis when there are philosophers who, by all objective external criteria, are at least equally 
well qualified to pronounce on that thesis and who reject it (1996, p. 31).13 
 
It is natural to see cases in these domains (law, science, religion, philosophy) as involving a 
mutually recognized disagreement between the parties involved: the majority of jurors, scientists, 
philosophers, and people with religious views are aware that there are equally intelligent and 
informed people who disagree with them. To take one example, consider the case of Peter van 
Inwagen and David Lewis, who had an extensive philosophical correspondence and thus were well 
aware of their disagreement about the compatibility of free will and determinism. To many, it can 
seem that the correct explanation of a protracted and mutually acknowledged disagreement 
between thinkers of formidable intelligence, such as the disagreement between van Inwagen and 
Lewis, should respect that fact that both parties hold rational beliefs. Part of the appeal of this 
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explanation is that it allows us to avoid attributing bad-faith inquiry or sloppy thinking to either of 
the parties involved. 
 So, let’s grant for now that the cases we have been examining provide some intuitive 
support for permissivism. But do they also support acknowledged permissivism over 
unacknowledged permissivism, as it is usually assumed? Although these cases often involve 
mutually recognized disagreement, it does not follow from that fact that these are acknowledged 
permissive cases. What is necessary for an acknowledged permissive case to obtain is the existence 
of a mutually recognized disagreement about P plus each party’s recognition that the other 
person’s attitude towards P is rational. So, in order for these cases to support acknowledged 
permissivism over unacknowledged permissivism, they must be construed as cases that involve 
rational disagreement between parties each of whom regard the other’s view as rational. 
Are the intuitive cases best construed as cases in which parties to a mutually recognized 
disagreement also regard one another’s views as rational? In fact, the cases usually offered to 
generate our permissivist intuitions are neutral on this point. There is typically no stipulation that 
the parties involved see one another’s views as rational, nor is this possibility ruled out. Instead, a 
story is given about how equally competent inquirers derive different conclusions from a single 
body of evidence.  To see an example of this, consider a generic description of a jury case that is 
meant to stir up our permissivist feelings:  
 
In a criminal trial we have a large, complex body of evidence, some of which appears to link 
the defendant with the crime, some of which suggests that he has nothing to do with it. 
Figuring out what to believe is a matter of weighing various considerations as we try to fit 
all the pieces together. Difficult cases like this tend to produce sharp disagreement even 
among the most diligent inquirers. (White 2005, p. 446)  
 
Here, a specific case is not described in great enough detail to give us an answer to the question of 
whether the disagreeing jurors regard one another’s views as just as rational as their own. For 
everything White says here, it’s open to the reader to interpret this as a case where the jurors regard 
one another’s views as rational. It’s also open to the reader to interpret it as a case in which they 
don’t. Forming the opinion that the juror’s views in this case are rational, then, speaks in favour 
of basic permissivism, but not necessarily in favour of acknowledged permissivism, or against 
unacknowledged permissivism. To see whether acknowledged permissivism in particular receives 
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strong support from our intuitions about particular cases, we would need to examine our intuitive 
reactions to cases like this one:  
 
acknowledged permissive jury case: A group of jurors are faced with a large, complex 
body of evidence in a criminal trial. Some of the evidence appears to link the defendant with 
the crime, and some of the evidence suggests that he has nothing to do with it. All of the 
jurors are diligent inquirers and each one of them considers the evidence conscientiously. 
After each juror has had a chance to privately form an opinion regarding the defendant’s 
guilt, the jurors share their opinions with one another. Some of the jurors think the defendant 
is guilty, and some of them think he is innocent. But, while standing by their initial verdicts, 
everyone who thinks the defendant is guilty recognizes that the opinions of those who think 
he is innocent are rational, and vice versa.  
 
If a significant number of people think that the jurors in this case are rational, we would have a 
clear case of intuitive support for acknowledged permissivism, and against unacknowledged 
permissivism. But here, in my experience, peoples’ intuitions are more mixed. It seems (to me) 
just as plausible that each juror, having scrutinized the evidence and done her best to ascertain its 
probative force, will not be rational to regard the opinions of disagreeing jurors as rational — at 
least insofar as she retains her original opinion. In other words, one might just as easily think there 
is something problematic about a case in which disputants have come to different conclusions 
about P on the basis of E and nevertheless regard one another’s views as rational.14 
 I’ve just claimed that cases like the acknowledged permissive jury case might seem 
intuitively problematic to some, but there are undoubtedly those who will lack this intuition. I ask 
those who fit that description to consider Peter van Inwagen’s reaction to his disagreement with 
David Lewis as an example of how challenging it can be for a rational person to acknowledge that 
a view they disagree with, made on the basis of the same evidence they possess, is rational. If one 
thinks acknowledged permissivism is true, and that van Inwagen and Lewis’s disagreement is an 
example of an acknowledged permissive case, one should hope that Van Inwagen would conclude 
at some point over the course of this protracted and mutually acknowledged philosophical 
disagreement that he and Lewis held rational incompatible doxastic attitudes on the basis of their 
shared body of evidence. But this was not van Inwagen’s response. Instead, he concluded that he 
(van Inwagen) must possess some incommunicable insight into the subject matter that Lewis 
lacked. That is, van Inwagen concluded that he was in possession of some extra (inarticulable or 
otherwise incommunicable) evidence that put him in a superior evidential position to Lewis. 
 9 
Notably, Van Inwagen did not conclude that his disagreement with Lewis was an instance of an 
acknowledged permissive case.15  
Let me be clear about my use of this example: I’m not claiming that this anecdote shows 
that one can’t rationally regard an opinion other than one’s own as rational. Rather, I bring it up to 
show how it can seem right, when in the throes of an intense disagreement with someone one 
respects, to nevertheless resist the conclusion that that person’s view is both based on the same 
evidence and rational. Van Inwagen’s response to this dilemma was to give up on the idea that he 
and Lewis shared the same evidence.  
So far I’ve argued that our intuitions about typical cases used to support permissivism don’t 
provide more support for acknowledged permissivism than they do for unacknowledged 
permissivism, because it’s possible to interpret them either as acknowledged permissive cases or 
as unacknowledged permissive cases. Further, I’ve suggested that cases like acknowledged 
permissive jury case, in which it is stipulated that disputants regard one another’s views as 
perfectly rational, generate mixed intuitions. Some readers may remain unmoved on this last point. 
To these readers, it will seem that even jurors who recognize one another’s opposing views as 
rational can themselves be rational. I’ll conclude this section by suggesting two error theories about 
our intuitions in this case, and more generally in the types of cases typically offered to provide 
intuitive support for permissivism.16 That is, I’ll provide two theories according to which the best 
possible explanation of the cases under consideration could seem to be that they that they involve 
rational disagreement between the parties involved, when that is not in fact the case. In doing so, 
I hope to provide those who still feel the pull of acknowledged permissivism with reason to 
question their intuitions about cases like the acknowledged permissive jury case.  
 
Error theory 1: We might confuse judgments about the agents with judgments about the agents’ 
attitudes.  
 
Consider the difference between the judgment that someone else is a rational person, and the 
judgment that a particular attitude of hers is rational. In order to arrive at a judgment of the first 
kind, we might consider factors such as whether the person typically reasons to conclusions that 
are supported by the evidence, or whether she usually uses good belief-forming processes, or 
whether she possesses certain character traits such as curiosity, intellectual humility, open-
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mindedness, or other traits that characterize the epistemically virtuous. Notice, too, that it is 
possible for these judgments to diverge: we might think that someone is, in general, a rational 
person, but that, in this particular case, she’s come to hold an irrational belief.  
 The cases that are meant to provide intuitive support for permissivism often rely on 
descriptions of the parties to the disagreement that encourage readers to regard them as the kind of 
people who typically form rational beliefs—for example, by describing them as ‘diligent inquirers’ 
or ‘well qualified’ to render a judgment on the topic in question. These descriptions emphasize the 
epistemic virtues that would be relevant to making global judgments about the agents as 
individuals. Encouraging readers to think of the subjects as the kind of people who typically form 
rational beliefs, and then asking a question about whether their beliefs are rational in this particular 
case, makes it easy to confuse being a reasonable person with having a reasonable attitude. But a 
judgment that the participants in some case are ‘rational people’ is not the same as a judgment that, 
in this particular case, they both hold rational attitudes towards some proposition. The latter 
judgment is what is needed in order for cases involving disagreement between jurors, 
paleontologists, philosophers, or people of different religious persuasions to provide intuitive 
support for permissivism.  
 One possible explanation of our intuitions about these cases is that they amount to 
judgments that the parties involved are rational in a global sense, rather than judgments that their 
respective attitudes in the particular case in question are rational. However, the latter judgment is 
what is needed to support either basic permissivism or acknowledged permissivism. If this error-
theoretic explanation is correct, then our intuitions about test cases will not support permissivism 
at all, let alone acknowledged permissivism.  
 
Error theory 2: We might confuse judgments about the rationality of others’ beliefs with 
judgments about whether they are deserving of respect, or whether they are worthwhile 
conversation partners.  
 
For some, the intuitive appeal of acknowledged permissivism is that it allows parties to a 
disagreement to espouse intellectual humility, or to somehow treat others with respect, in a way 
that competing theories of epistemic rationality cannot. Unacknowledged permissivism and 
impermissivism both entail that I can never rationally accept the view of my peer as rational, while 
 11 
retaining my own view.17 For impermissivism, this is because there is only ever one rational 
response to the evidence, so either my own view or my peer’s will be rational. If I’m the rational 
one, I shouldn’t falsely believe that my peer’s view is rational too—instead, I should regard her 
view as irrational. On the other hand, if my peer is the rational one, and I come to recognize this, 
I should abandon my own view and adopt the rational view of my peer. Either way, I can’t 
rationally recognize my peer’s view as rational while retaining my own. Unacknowledged 
permissivism has the same consequence, because according to UP, the only permissive cases are 
cases in which each party’s view is rational, but neither party believes that the attitude of the other 
party is rational. 
One might think that someone who disagrees with the conclusions of other competent 
inquirers tasked with assessing a complex body of evidence lacks intellectual humility, or 
somehow fails to treat the other inquirers with due respect, if she concludes that their views are 
irrational. Regarding one’s peers’ beliefs as irrational may seem like something only a jerk would 
do, in Schwitzgebel’s sense of the term. According to him, a jerk is someone who ‘culpably fails 
to appreciate the perspectives of others around him, treating them as tools to be manipulated or 
idiots to be dealt with rather than as moral and epistemic peers’ (2014). Some people may be drawn 
to acknowledged permissivism because it seems to be the only way to avoid the consequence that 
to be perfectly rational, one must be a jerk.   
The assumption behind this line of thought is that believing one’s peer’s belief is irrational 
necessarily involves acting like a jerk—treating them with a lack of respect, as an object to be 
manipulated and not as an epistemic peer. While regarding someone’s belief as irrational is 
definitely compatible with treating them in this way, this needn’t be the case. To the contrary, a 
belief that someone else’s belief is irrational (or a failure to see how it could be rational) can 
sometimes serve as motivation to continue engaging in inquiry with that person, redoubling one’s 
efforts to see how he or she arrived at her view. In so doing, one might naturally reconsider whether 
one’s own position is correct. Thus, it does not follow from the fact that one judges that someone 
else’s view is irrational that one fails to treat them as an epistemic peer, or that one treats them as 
an object to be manipulated.18 
Believing that someone else’s belief is irrational is also compatible with seeing that person 
as being, in general, a responsible epistemic agent who erred on this occasion (see previous error-
theoretic explanation). So, believing that the beliefs of others who disagree with you on the basis 
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of the same evidence are irrational (or failing to see how their beliefs could be rational) need not 
involve a lack of respect towards one’s peers.  
So, if one’s rejection of unacknowledged permissivism is the result of a hesitancy to adopt 
a theory of rationality that entails that rational belief necessarily involves moral or epistemic vice, 
this rejection is unfounded. The truth of unacknowledged permissivism need not involve anything 
less than treating others with full respect.   
The first error theory calls into question whether our intuitions about test cases really give 
any support to permissivism. The second error theory calls into question whether our intuitions 
support acknowledged permissivism in particular. But if either theory is correct, there will be an 
explanation of our intuitions about test cases that is in harmony with unacknowledged 
permissivism. So in order to show that the kind of cases typically offered to generate permissivist 
intuitions support acknowledged permissivism over unacknowledged permissivism, we should 
first rule out these error theories.  
 
4 The Arbitrariness Objection 
 
In the previous section I argued that the cases typically offered to provide intuitive support for 
permissivism, and often thought to support acknowledged over unacknowledged versions of the 
view, do not provide more support for acknowledged permissivism than they do for 
unacknowledged permissivism. In fact, there is some reason to suspect our intuitive reactions to 
the kinds of cases that are usually provided to generate intuitive support for acknowledged 
permissivism actually do no such thing. In this section, I turn to what I see as one of the major 
virtues of and motivations for UP: its ability to withstand the most serious objection to 
permissivism, the arbitrariness objection. My goal here is to give a succinct characterization of the 
objection, which appears in the literature in many forms, and to show that it applies only to 
acknowledged versions of permissivism. Our discussion of the arbitrariness objection will also 
suggest a plausible motivation for UP: namely, that it respects a requirement of rationality that I 
call the ‘anti-arbitrariness requirement’ (or AAR). Later in this section, I’ll discuss the anti-
arbitrariness requirement in greater detail.   
 The arbitrariness objection to permissivism is discussed at length by White (2005, 2013), 
but see also Christensen (2007) and Feldman (2006) for early mentions of the problem. Since then, 
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the objection has surfaced in many places in the literature under the label of arbitrariness 
(Schoenfield 2014; Simpson 2017), instability (Weisberg forthcoming), or inconsistency (Greco 
and Hedden 2016). The objection takes the form of a reductio against permissivism. It goes 
roughly as follows: in cases where the permissivist herself recognizes that a belief that not-P is 
just as rational as a belief that P given her evidence, her own commitment to P is problematically 
arbitrary. Because permissivism allows individuals to adopt arbitrary beliefs, it is said to be in 
some way incoherent, inconsistent, or unstable.  
White, in his discussion of this style of objection, likens an agent’s adherence to her belief 
in a permissive case to a person’s adherence to his belief in a case in which he knows the belief is 
the result of his having taken a belief-inducing pill (2005, p. 448).19 A belief formed by taking a 
belief-inducing pill is no more likely than chance to be true, and it’s clear enough that there is 
something arbitrary about forming a belief this way. But why should the person in a permissive 
case see her belief that P as no more likely than chance to be true? Presumably, because of another 
judgment she holds; namely, that a belief that not-P would also be rational. According to this line 
of thought, what’s wrong with permissivism is that it allows problematic pairs of judgments in 
permissive cases. Someone in a permissive case is permitted to believe that P (i.e. to judge that P 
is true) and simultaneously to judge that not-P is rational given evidence E. It is the combination 
of these attitudes that many authors identify as problematic.20 
Though the details vary from author to author, there is a common concern in the objections 
to permissivism that charge it with instability, arbitrariness, or inconsistency. Most authors who 
find the arbitrariness objection persuasive, or simply seek to characterize it, agree that the objection 
charges permissivism with violating a prohibition on certain combinations of attitudes that are 
themselves irrational. We can summarize the rational requirement that is at the crux of the 
arbitrariness objection as follows:  
 
Anti-arbitrariness requirement (AAR): Do not adopt a doxastic attitude towards P, based 
on a body of evidence E, while believing that an incompatible doxastic attitude towards P is 
rational based on E.21 
 
The arbitrariness objection charges permissivism with allowing attitudes that violate a coherence 
requirement of rationality. Coherence requirements of theoretical rationality are prohibitions on 
holding certain combinations of attitudes. For example, if there is a requirement that prohibits 
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agents from holding combinations of beliefs that violate the law of non-contradiction, it counts as 
a coherence requirement. Similarly, if the enkratic requirement, which prohibits a person from 
believing P while believing that she is rationally required to refrain from believing P, is a 
requirement of theoretical rationality, it is a coherence requirement (cf. Broome, 2013). Likewise, 
the anti-arbitrariness requirement, if it is a genuine requirement of rationality, will be a coherence 
requirement.  
In short, any theory of rationality that says that the requirements of rationality permit 
combinations of attitudes that themselves violate a requirement of rationality is self-defeating. 
Thus, since permissivism licenses agents to violate AAR, permissivism is self-defeating. The 
arbitrariness argument against permissivism can be laid out more succinctly as follows.  
 
Arbitrariness argument against permissivism 
1. Sometimes, belief that P and belief that not-P are both rational, given evidence E. (basic 
permissivism) 
2. One is never rationally permitted to hold some doxastic attitude towards P one the basis of 
E while believing that an incompatible doxastic attitude towards P is rational on E. (AAR) 
3. Sometimes, one is rationally permitted to believe P on the basis of E, and rationally 
permitted to believe that a belief that not-P is rational on E.  
Therefore, 
4. Permissivism licenses agents to violate a requirement of rationality. (2, 3)  
5. The correct theory of rationality does not license agents to violate the requirements of 
rationality.   
 Therefore,  
C.   Permissivism is false. (1, 4, 5) 
 
Premise 1 of the argument simply says that basic permissive cases can occur: it is a statement of 
basic permissivism for the sake of reductio. Premise 2, though we have not said much in its explicit 
defense, captures that thought, shared by many authors, that there is something unstable (and thus 
rationally impermissible) about affirming the rationality of not-P while believing that P. Some 
permissivists simply reject AAR: they hold that there is nothing wrong with such pairs of attitudes 
(see Meacham, 2014; Schoenfield, 2014). However, I think there is some reason to side with those 
who believe that AAR expresses a genuine requirement of rationality.  
 Why think that one violates a requirement of rationality when one believes that P while 
acknowledging that a belief that not-P is equally rational? For a start, AAR bears a strong 
resemblance to the principle of Immodesty, which is itself typically taken to be a requirement of 
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rationality. Immodesty prohibits an agent from adopting an inductive method that estimates that it 
is less accurate than any other inductive method (Lewis 1971). Some versions of Immodesty go 
further, stipulating that one should regard one’s own inductive method as more accurate than any 
alternative (Horowitz 2013, p. 43) So Immodesty says that you should believe that your inductive 
method is as accurate as any alternative, or perhaps even that you should believe it is more accurate 
than any alternative. The motivation for accepting Immodesty as a requirement of rationality is 
that rational agents should use inductive methods that they take to be maximally truth-conducive: 
you are less than perfectly rational if you adopt an inductive method that you judge to be less 
accurate than some alternative.  
There is a similar motivation available for the purported rational requirement expressed by 
AAR. AAR says that you should not believe P when you think that some other incompatible 
attitude is rational on the basis of your evidence. The reason for accepting this principle as a 
requirement of rationality is that rational agents should hold beliefs that they take to be maximally 
rational. You are less than perfectly rational if you adopt a belief that you judge to be no better 
than some alternative. Just as a rational agent shouldn’t use an inductive method that she takes to 
be no better than a competing method, a rational agent shouldn’t hold a belief that she takes to be 
no more rational than a competing belief. I take this to be a prima facie reason for accepting AAR 
as a genuine requirement of rationality.22 
Premise 3 of the arbitrariness argument says that I can sometimes rationally believe that 
my disagreement with a peer is an instance of a permissive case—that is, I can rationally take some 
attitude towards P while believing that another attitude towards P is rational on the basis of the 
same evidence. For simplicity, call this conjunction of beliefs the belief that I’m in a permissive 
case. If permissive cases are possible (as we have assumed in Premise 1) it seems natural to think 
that it can be rational for me to believe I’m in one.  Suppose I am in fact in a basic permissive case, 
and I rationally believe P on the basis of E. Since this is a permissive case, the belief that not-P is 
also rational, given E. And if belief that not-P is rational, I should be rationally permitted to believe 
that a belief that not-P is rational. So it seems that I should be able both to rationally believe that 
P, and to rationally hold that a belief that not-P is rational. If one thinks that permissive cases can 
occur, then, one should be amenable to accepting Premise 3.  
It follows from Premises 2 and 3 that permissivism licenses subjects to violate the 
requirements of rationality (Premise 4). Premise 5, which states that the correct theory of 
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rationality will not permit agents to violate the requirements of rationality, though not accepted 
universally, seems exceedingly plausible to many philosophers.23 We have derived a contradiction 
from our assumption of basic permissivism, so basic permissivism must be false.  
The arbitrariness argument against permissivism poses a problem for permissivists who 
accept the idea that one can sometimes rationally believe that one is in a permissive case. 
Acknowledged permissivists, of course, must accept this: the view that acknowledged permissive 
cases are possible just is the view that one can sometimes believe one is in a permissive case.  
On the other hand, proponents of unacknowledged permissivism deny that one can ever 
rationally believe that one is in a permissive case, and therefore would reject Premise 3 while 
accepting Premise 2. One way to resist the arbitrariness objection, then, is to endorse 
unacknowledged permissivism, and deny that it is ever rationally permissible to believe that you 
are in a permissive case. This can be an appealing response to the arbitrariness objection if, like 
White, Weisberg, Simpson, Greco, Hedden, and others, one finds it plausible that there is 
something problematic about believing P while recognizing that an incompatible attitude toward 
P is rationally permissible.  
That UP is unsusceptible to the arbitrariness objection is not a new point: Ballantyne and 
Coffman (2012, p. 663 ff.), Horowitz (2013, footnote 20) Schoenfield (2013), White (2005), and 
Weisberg (forthcoming) all appreciate that arbitrariness-style worries are not effective against 
versions of permissivism that deny the possibility of acknowledged permissive cases. However, 
by and large the trend among these authors is to hastily dismiss UP as implausible, focusing their 
attention instead on the prospects for acknowledged permissivism. Here, my aim is to cast UP’s 
ability to withstand the arbitrariness objection as a possible motivation for the view. UP should be 
attractive to those who are both inclined to accept basic permissivism, and to accept AAR as a 
requirement of rationality.  
 
5 Objections to Unacknowledged Permissivism 
 
So far, we’ve seen that unacknowledged permissivism can fulfill some of the intuitive motivations 
for permissivism and that, unlike acknowledged permissivism, it doesn’t succumb to charges of 
instability or arbitrariness. But still, one might worry that it entails that, in permissive cases, one’s 
attitude toward P cannot rationally survive one’s learning the epistemic value of one’s evidence; 
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or that it entails that it is not possible ever to identify permissive cases. In this section, I address 
these objections to UP.  
 
5.1 Learning the epistemic value of one’s evidence 
 
White claims that it is ‘natural to suppose that a belief can always rationally survive learning the 
epistemic value of one’s evidence. That is, if it is rational to believe P given evidence E, then it is 
rational to believe P given E and E’, where E’ correctly states what attitudes towards P are 
rationally permissible given E’ (2005, p. 450). White believes that learning the epistemic value of 
one’s evidence should not impact the rationality of the doxastic attitudes one formed on the basis 
of that evidence. For simplicity, let’s call this idea White’s claim.  
 
White’s claim: Rational beliefs can always survive learning the epistemic value of one’s 
evidence.  
 
If White’s claim is correct, unacknowledged permissivism must be false. To see this, recall that 
according to UP, there are possible cases in which E makes rational belief that P and E makes 
rational belief that not-P. Suppose that I am in such a case, and I rationally believe P on the basis 
of E. Also according to UP, rationality prohibits me from believing P on the basis of E while 
believing that an incompatible attitude toward P is rational. So according to UP, if I learn the 
epistemic value of E (that is, if I come to know that E rationalizes incompatible doxastic attitudes 
toward P), it will no longer be rational for me to retain my original belief that P. In short: if UP is 
correct, then if I come to correctly believe that I am in a permissive case with regard to some 
proposition P, my original rational attitude towards P ceases to be rational. 
White thinks that most people will accept the idea that the rationality of a belief should not 
be impacted by learning the epistemic value of one’s evidence. While White’s claim does seem 
plausible, in order for it to constitute a robust refutation of UP, it requires further defense. 
Something more needs to be said about why we would expect one’s doxastic attitude towards P to 
be able to survive the revelation that one’s evidence also rationalizes an alternative doxastic 
attitude towards P.  
 One possible motivation for White’s claim is the idea that rational doxastic states should 
not depend on ignorance. If unacknowledged permissivism is correct, only ignorance of the 
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epistemic value of my evidence allows me to preserve the rationality of my belief that P, when I 
am in a permissive case. We might think that what’s problematic about this state of affairs is that 
only ignorance of the true nature of my situation allows me to preserve my rationality. My attitude 
towards P can remain rational only so long as I remain in the dark with respect to the rationality 
of other points of view. This seems odd, and some might think it grounds for rejecting UP.  
  On closer examination, though, we see that this consequence of unacknowledged 
permissivism is actually an instance of a more general phenomenon. Permissive cases are not the 
only kind of case in which we can secure a special epistemic status for a belief only through 
ignorance of some other true proposition. In fact, such cases are commonplace. As an example of 
the broader phenomenon in question, consider the ordinary occurrence of rational false belief. 
Suppose I rationally believe that P, and that P is in fact false. My belief that P is rational by 
stipulation. And of course, there is nothing strange about the thought that I may come to possess 
some new evidence that leads me to recognize that P is false: we acquire new information and 
update our beliefs in light of it all the time. Suppose I do come to acquire new information that 
entails that P is false, and that I recognize the implications that my new information has for the 
truth of P. Because of my acquisition of new evidence that entails that P is false, belief that P is no 
longer rational for me.  
 As in an unacknowledged permissive case, the case of rational false belief is one in which 
my attitude towards one proposition (namely, P) is rational only so long as I am ignorant of some 
other proposition(s)—the one that entails that P is false. The idea that rational beliefs shouldn’t 
depend on ignorance about the true nature of one’s situation, then, isn’t a plausible motivation for 
White’s claim, since this line of reasoning will end up condemning intuitively unproblematic and 
commonplace cases of rational false belief, too.  
To take another example of a kind of case in which a special epistemic status for a belief 
can be preserved only through ignorance of some other proposition, consider skeptical threats to 
ordinary knowledge. Grant that skepticism is false, and that under ordinary circumstances I have 
knowledge of facts about my immediate environment. In particular, I know that I have hands. But 
now, my skeptically-inclined friend raises the possibility that I might be a disembodied envatted 
brain being made to believe that I have hands. Suppose I rationally admit that it is possible that I 
am a disembodied brain, and I agree that, if that were the case, I would not have hands, and hence 
not know that I have hands. Some philosophers have argued that when I make this admission, I 
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lose knowledge of the fact that I have hands. According to this view, I can know that I have hands 
as long as I’m not thinking about the possibility that I might be a disembodied brain, but once I 
start entertaining that possibility, I lose knowledge of that proposition. If these philosophers are 
correct, this is another example of a case in which my attitude towards one proposition has a certain 
epistemic status (knowledge) only so long as I lack knowledge of another proposition (namely, 
that it is possible that I am an envatted brain).24 
Because there are plenty of uncontroversial cases in which rational belief (or knowledge) 
can be preserved only through the right kind of ignorance, we should seek a different motivation 
for White’s claim. A more promising idea is that rational doxastic states should not depend on 
ignorance of a priori facts.25 As the case of rational false belief illustrates, the rationality of our 
beliefs often depends on our ignorance of empirical truths of which we lack knowledge because 
of our contingent circumstances. (Consider: I can rationally believe it’s not raining in my part of 
town on the basis of my reliable weather app when I am in my windowless kitchen. But if I were 
to step out into my living room, I would see the rain and my belief would no longer be rational. 
There is nothing odd or problematic about this.) However, in contrast to empirical truths, a priori 
truths are always available or accessible. As a result, we might expect that learning an a priori 
truth should never impact the epistemic status of a rational belief. This thought, combined with the 
assumption that facts about what beliefs a body of evidence rationalizes are a priori, entails White’s 
claim.   
That the rationality of an attitude should not depend on ignorance of a priori facts initially 
seems much more promising than our previous proposal. Intuitively, if it’s rational to believe that 
it’s raining outside, then my learning that cubes have six sides, or that all bachelors are unmarried, 
or that 42 x 13 = 546, or some other a priori truth, does not change the rationality of my belief.  
On the other hand, many authors believe there are cases in which the rationality of a belief 
can be undermined by learning an a priori truth. One example is that of Fermat’s Last Theorem, 
first conjectured in 1637 by Pierre Fermat, and finally proved by Andrew Wiles in 1994. Most 
philosophers would agree that, as a theorem of number theory, Fermat’s Last Theorem is an a 
priori truth. In the approximately-350-year span between the time Fermat raised the conjecture 
and the time it was proven to be true, mathematicians rationally suspended judgment on the matter. 
In this case, the rationality of the mathematicians’ suspension of judgment about the theorem 
depended on their ignorance of an a priori truth—that is, their ignorance of the theorem itself. 
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Since there are cases in which the rationality of a belief depends on a subject’s ignorance of an a 
priori truth, we should keep looking for a better justification for White’s claim.  
Perhaps what is most plausible is that White’s claim is not a particular instance of a more 
general principle such as the ones we have been discussing, but that it arises from a certain view 
of the relationship between rational belief and evidential support. White’s claim could seem natural 
or even self-evident on the assumption that facts about what it is rational to believe are reducible 
to facts about evidential support. Under this assumption, the argument for White’s claim might go 
something like this. Suppose I am in a case in which I rationally believe P on the basis of E. Since 
I am rational to believe P on the basis of E, E must support P. When I learn that a belief that not-
P is also rational on E, I learn that E also supports not-P. But simply learning that the evidence 
supports another doxastic attitude towards P does not change the fact that the evidence supports 
my own belief, and thus cannot alter the rationality of my belief that P. Generalizing, we can 
conclude that rational beliefs can always survive learning the evidential value of one’s evidence.   
This motivation for White’s claim, while the most promising of those that have been 
discussed, depends on an assumption that many epistemologists – and more to the point, many 
proponents of permissivism – will find it difficult to accept: that facts about what it is rational for 
a subject to believe are reducible to facts about what that subject’s evidence supports. This is a 
controversial assumption: many epistemologists think that variables other than a subject’s 
evidence can be relevant to determining whether her belief is justified. So White’s claim is most 
plausible when given a somewhat controversial assumption.  
Still, suppose we grant the assumption that facts about whether a belief is rational for a 
subject are reducible to facts about what the subject’s evidence supports. It’s true that, given this 
assumption, my learning that E supports not-P can’t change the fact that E supports P, and thus 
can’t change the fact that believing P on the basis of E is rational. However, learning that E 
supports not-P can change whether it is rational for me to go on believing P – for my total evidence 
is no longer E. My evidence has expanded from E to E + E’, where E’ correctly states which 
attitudes are rational for someone who possesses evidence E. So while it’s true that learning E’ 
won’t change the fact that belief that P is still rational on E, when I learn E’, it is not guaranteed 
that my belief that P will still be rational on my total evidence, which now includes more than just 
E. The above argument for White’s claim fails, then, because it neglects to account for the possible 
change in the rationality of my attitude toward P that can occur when my total evidence changes.  
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In summary, White’s argument against unacknowledged permissivism depends on the idea 
that one’s rational beliefs can always survive learning the epistemic value of the evidence upon 
which those beliefs are based (i.e., it depends on White’s claim). I have argued that White’s claim 
seems most plausible on the assumption that facts about what it is rational for a subject to believe 
are reducible to facts about what the evidence supports. Even granting this assumption, however, 
it is unclear why we should think that a subject who learns the epistemic value of her evidence for 
P would still be rational to believe P, since her evidence about P has now changed. I conclude that 
White’s claim is not an adequate basis for rejecting unacknowledged permissivism.  
 
5.2. The no identifiable permissive cases objection 
 
Unacknowledged permissivism says that I cannot rationally identify a case as permissive when I 
am in one. More precisely, UP entails that, for any given situation in which I possess permissive 
evidence and hold a rational attitude that is supported by that evidence, I cannot rationally believe 
that my evidence is permissive (i.e. that it makes rational a doxastic attitude that is incompatible 
with my own). One way of thinking about this commitment of UP is that the view says that I can’t 
rationally identify a case as permissive from the first-person perspective. But one might worry that 
the view also entails that I can’t rationally believe that any case is permissive, even from the third-
person perspective. Why? Suppose I claim that a particular case, C, in which two subjects disagree 
about P on the basis of a single body of evidence, is permissive. Presumably, I also have some 
doxastic attitude towards P: belief, disbelief, or suspension of judgment. But if I have some 
doxastic attitude towards P, then I shouldn’t judge that a doxastic attitude incompatible with P is 
rational, because doing so will violate AAR. So I cannot rationally judge that C is a permissive 
case. Generalizing, unacknowledged permissivism seems to entail that no one can recognize a 
permissive case, even from an observer’s third-person perspective. And if there are no identifiable 
permissive cases, it is hard to see why one would should believe that unacknowledged 
permissivism is correct. Call this the no identifiable permissive cases objection. 
 One possible response to this objection is to claim that identification of permissive cases 
is only possible when the person identifying the permissive case – the observer – lacks a doxastic 
attitude towards P. If the observer lacks a doxastic attitude towards P, she does not violate AAR 
when she identifies a case as permissive. To violate AAR, one needs to hold some attitude towards 
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P based on E while believing that an incompatible attitude is rational based on E. According to 
UP, there is no prohibition against believing more than one doxastic attitude towards P is rational 
based on a particular body of evidence when one does not share that evidence. So permissive cases 
can be identified from a third-person perspective only when the observer does not herself hold 
some attitude towards P.  
 I do not think this reply will work. This is because it seem unlikely that there are cases in 
which one understands and is aware of P, yet has no doxastic attitude towards P. Arguably, even 
states such as suspension of judgment (Friedman 2013) and agnosticism (Decker 2012) qualify as 
genuine doxastic attitudes. So, even in cases in which one is uncertain about whether P, one will 
count as taking some doxastic attitude towards P. And if one takes some doxastic attitude towards 
P, AAR prohibits one from rationally regarding any other attitude towards P as rational. We seem 
to be back where we started: with no identifiable permissive cases, even from the observer’s 
perspective.26   
 A more promising response to this objection is to say that it is possible for an observer to 
identify permissive cases only when he has different evidence than the disputants. AAR prohibits 
me from judging that a doxastic attitude towards P other than my own is rational only when both 
my attitude towards P and the alternative attitude are based on the same body of evidence. 
Whenever the observer has the same evidence as the participants, then the observer’s attitudes will 
be capable of running afoul of AAR. When the observer’s epistemic situation is identical to that 
of the participants, he is himself a participant. Under these circumstances, the observer cannot 
rationally recognize that is a particular case is permissive. 
 But the situation is different if the observer’s evidence differs from the disputants’ 
evidence. If the observer has evidence that the participants lack, and that is relevant to the question 
of whether the case in question is a permissive one, the observer should be able to rationally believe 
the case is permissive without violating AAR. To see how this might go, let’s consider the 
following case: 
 
Rational Observer 
Ann and Beth rationally disagree about P on the basis of evidence E. Ann believes P, and 
Beth disbelieves P. Charlie is an observer of Ann and Beth’s disagreement: he possesses 
evidence E + O, where O is additional evidence that includes both evidence relevant to the 
truth of P and evidence about whether evidence E is permissive. On the basis of E + O, 
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Charlie comes to believe P. There is no other attitude towards P that Charlie regards as 
rational on the basis of E + O.  
 
Charlie’s belief that P does not violate AAR, which requires that he not adopt an attitude towards 
P based on E + O that he regards as just as rational as his own. But can Charlie rationally believe 
that Ann’s belief that P on the basis of E is rational and that Beth’s belief that not-P on the basis 
of E is rational? Since O includes evidence that Ann and Beth are in a permissive case, it seems 
that he should be able to rationally believe that E is permissive with respect to P.27 Charlie’s 
additional evidence that Ann and Beth’s case meets the requirements for a permissive case can 
serve as a basis for a rational judgment that they are in a permissive case. Ann and Beth, on the 
other hand, lack evidence that their own case meets the requirements for a permissive case, so 
unlike Charlie, they don’t have enough information to rationally believe that their evidence is 
permissive. So, only when observers possess different evidence from the disputants is it possible 
for an observer to recognize that a case is permissive for the participants without violating the 
requirement of rationality expressed by AAR.  
 Even so, one might think that a problem remains for UP. If observers can come to learn 
that a particular case has the features of a permissive case, and on that basis come to rationally 
regard it as a permissive case, why can’t participants in a permissive case do the same thing?  
 One possible response is to point out that in practice, it is very difficult to acquire strong 
evidence that one’s own case is permissive. Most versions of permissivism on offer posit that 
rational disagreement arises as a result of different people having different rational approaches to 
the evidence (for instance, different prior conditional probabilities, different cognitive abilities, or 
different epistemic values). In practice, it is very hard to determine the precise epistemic values, 
cognitive abilities, or whatever, that lead individuals to hold different beliefs. Consequently, it is 
difficult to acquire strong evidence that a particular case is permissive.  
However, this response falls short because it cedes the theoretical possibility of cases in which 
one acquires strong evidence that one’s own case is permissive. If the proponent of UP allows that 
it is possible for a subject to acquire evidence that her own case is permissive, it doesn’t matter if 
this kind of case is unlikely to occur in practice: since UP denies that acknowledged permissive 
cases are possible, all that is needed to prove it false is the possibility of a subject’s rationally 
believing that he is in a permissive case. 
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So the proponent of UP should say that it is in principle possible for subjects in a permissive 
case to acquire strong evidence that their shared evidence is permissive, even if this is extremely 
rare in practice. Returning to our case involving Ann and Beth, suppose both Ann and Beth acquire 
evidence that strongly supports the conclusion that Ann and Beth’s original evidence, E, is 
permissive. Now, we face the question of what beliefs Ann and Beth would be rational to form on 
their total evidence.  
Unacknowledged permissivism can allow, and should allow, that Ann can come to rationally 
believe, on the basis of her new, expanded evidence, that E rationalizes both the belief that P and 
the belief that not-P. (The same goes for Beth.) That is, the proponent of UP can and should 
maintain that Ann can rationally believe that E is permissive with respect to P. However, when 
Ann comes to hold the belief the E is permissive with respect to P, she faces rational pressure to 
revise her original attitude toward P. Ann’s rational belief that there is a rational approach to E that 
yields the belief that not-P constitutes a reason for her to revise her original belief that P.  
So, the proponent of UP can allow both that subjects can acquire strong evidence that their 
original evidence is permissive with respect to some proposition P, and that they can come to 
rationally believe that their original evidence is permissive. However, the defender of UP should 
also maintain that, as soon as this happens, the subjects cease to be in a situation in which their 
shared evidence supports incompatible doxastic attitudes. Rather, they now both face rational 
pressure to revise their respective attitudes towards P. Acquiring strong evidence that one is in a 
permissive case changes the case such the participants how have evidence which is not permissive 
with respect to P. So defenders of UP can allow that subjects can acquire strong evidence that their 
own case is permissive without this posing a threat to the coherence of their view. 
This conclusion about the rational course of action for the person who comes to believe an 
attitude other than his own towards P is rational bears some resemblance to conciliatory views in 
the epistemology of disagreement. Conciliationists say that when you disagree about P with a peer 
on the basis of the same evidence, you must modify your attitude towards P in the direction of 
your peer’s attitude (e.g. Christensen, 2007; Cohen, 2013; Elga, 2007). One standard defense of 
conciliationism holds that the disagreement constitutes evidence that some other response to the 
evidence is more rational than your own. And the rational response to evidence that some other 
view is just as rational as one’s own is to modify one’s original view, according to the 
conciliationist. 
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The similarity between conciliationism and the version of unacknowledged permissivism that 
I have discussed here is that both agree that when I come to believe that a view other than my own 
but based on my own evidence is rational, the required response is to modify my original view. 
The difference between concilationsim and UP is that, according to UP, the mere fact that I 
disagree with my peer does not itself rationally compel me to conclude that some other view is just 
as rational as my own, and thus does not rationally compel me to modify my original attitude 
towards P. According to UP, I might recognize that a peer disagrees with me, and yet rationally 
refrain from forming the belief that my peer’s view is just as rational as my own. According to 
conciliationism, recognizing that your peer has a different attitude towards P triggers rational 
pressure to revise your attitude towards P. According to the version of unacknowledged 
permissivism that I am defending, believing that your peer has a different rational attitude towards 
P triggers rational pressure for you to revise your attitude towards P. But when confronted with 
peer disagreement, it can also be rational to fail to recognize your peer’s attitude as rational. So 
UP, unlike conciliationism, holds that there is more than one rational way of responding to the 
disagreement of a peer.  
The comparison with conciliationism leads me to a final question that might arise about my 
view: the question of whether an actual case of rational disagreement with a peer needs to occur 
in order for the rationality of my attitude towards P to be undermined. Is an actual disagreeing peer 
necessary, or is simply believing that a view other than my own is rational sufficient to render my 
attitude towards P irrational? 
For versions of unacknowledged permissivism that rest on the appeal of AAR, the answer 
will be that that the presence of another person is not necessary. All that is needed in order for the 
rationality of my attitude towards P to be undermined is for me to believe that some attitude 
incompatible with my own (but based on the same evidence) is rational. But one might worry that, 
if believing an incompatible attitude is rational is all that is necessary to fall afoul of AAR, then 
the rationality of many of my beliefs will be undermined. 
This conclusion would follow if we always recognized the permissive nature of a case when 
we were in one. But as a matter of fact, we often fail to recognize the rationality of other rational 
positions. As Kelly points out, interacting with peers who disagree with us can be helpful because 
it can cause us to treat alternative possible attitudes towards P with the attention that they deserve. 
The presence of actual disagreeing peers can ‘forcefully remind us of just how formidable the case 
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is for the thesis that they defend’ (2005, p. 192). The presence of a disagreeing peer, then, may 
make me more likely to recognize the rationality of an alternative attitude towards P. But 
ultimately, whether there exists rational pressure on me to revise my attitude towards P depends 
on whether or not I believe an attitude other than my own is rational.28 One way to be rational in a 
permissive case is to recognize that one is in a permissive case, and change one’s attitude towards 
P. But another way to be rational in a permissive case is just to fail to recognize the case as 
permissive. Since the features of a case that make it permissive, and whether those features obtain 
in any given case, are often opaque, we fail to recognize that we are in permissive cases quite 
frequently.29   
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Notes 
1 I’ll use the term doxastic attitude to refer to three attitudes a subject might adopt towards a proposition P: belief, 
disbelief, and suspension of judgment. I take the possible situations in which two subjects hold incompatible doxastic 
attitudes toward P to be the following: one subject believes P and the other disbelieves P; one subject suspends 
judgment about P and the other subject believes P; one subject suspends judgment about P and the other subject 
disbelieves P. I treat disbelief that P and belief that ~P as identical doxastic attitudes. 
2 I use the terms ‘position’ and ‘view’ as shorthand for ‘doxastic attitude.’ For simplicity, I specify doxastic attitudes 
in terms of belief, disbelief, and suspension of judgment, but what I say will also be applicable to creedal versions of 
permissivism and impermissivism.   
3 The nomenclature of ‘acknowledged’ and ‘unacknowledged’ versions of permissivism is due to Kopec and 
Titelbaum (2016), though other authors acknowledge the same distinction. See Ballantyne and Coffman (2011), Cohen 
(2013), Feldman (2006, 2007), Schoenfield (2014), Weisberg (forthcoming), and White (2005).  
4 One could fail to regard someone else’s attitude towards P as equally rational by suspending judgment on whether 
that attitude is rational, or by believing it to be irrational, or by failing to consider the question of whether that 
attitude is rational. 
5 An impermissivist is someone who endorses Feldman’s ‘Uniqueness Thesis’ (2007, p. 205). Feldman’s paper and 
White’s ‘Epistemic Permissiveness’ (2005) are usually cited as the seminal papers on Uniqueness. Here, I follow 
Horowitz (2013) in calling proponents of the Uniqueness thesis impermissivists.  
6 See, for example, Kelly (2013), Kopec (2015), Meacham (2014), Podgorski (2016), Schoenfield (2014), Simpson 
(2017) and Weisberg (forthcoming). On the other hand, Cohen (2013) argues for a version of unacknowledged 
permissivism. 
7 See, for example, Dogramaci & Horowitz (2016), Horowitz (2013), Schultheis (2018), and White (2005, 2013). 
8 If you think that rationality admits of degrees, you can define an unacknowledged permissive case as one in which 
two people rationally hold different doxastic attitudes toward P on the basis of a single body of evidence E, but 
neither party believes that the attitude of the other party is equally rational to her own.   
9 More precisely, unacknowledged permissivism says that you can be in a permissive case only if you don’t believe 
that an attitude incompatible with your own is rational on the basis of your evidence.  
10 Actually, my preferred version of unacknowledged permissivism differs slightly from the position described by 
White. I will argue that permissivism is true and epistemically destructive if known, but also that it is epistemically 
destructive if believed. 
11 According to Sorensen, there are different types of blindspots corresponding to different propositional attitudes. 
Sorensen defines a blindspot relative to attitude A for a subject a at time t as a proposition that is consistent but 
towards which subject a cannot have attitude A at time t (1988, p. 52, my emphasis). However, in the case of case of 
belief blindspots, the sense in which the subject ‘cannot’ believe the blindspot proposition is that the subject must be 
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immune from criticisms of inconsistency (cf. p. 53). So although Sorensen does not himself define belief blindspots 
in terms of what can be ‘rationally believed’ by a subject, to describe them as I have is consistent with his 
understanding of belief blindspots. 
12 Defenders of impermissive epistemologies, clearly enough, get nowhere towards vindicating rational disagreement: 
they must maintain the “awkward position” that maximally rational disputants, if they share the same evidence, will 
always be in agreement, since the total evidence alone determines what it is rational to believe (White 2005, p. 446). 
13 While van Inwagen speaks in terms of justified belief rather than rational belief, it is not uncommon to see these 
two terms used more or less interchangeably. (Cf. Feldman 2006, p. 220, and White 2005, p. 445-6.) Here, I use the 
terms ‘rational’ and ‘justified’ interchangeably. 
14 More on the idea that cases like these are problematic in the following section. 
15 The following passage illustrates how difficult van Inwagen found it to know how to respond to his disagreement 
with Lewis: ‘How can I believe (as I do) that free will is compatible with determinism…when David Lewis – a 
philosopher of truly formidable intelligence and insight and ability – rejects [this thing] I believe and is already aware 
of and understands perfectly every argument that I could produce in [its] defense? Well, I do believe [this thing]. And 
I believe that I am justified in believing it. And I am confident that I am right. But how can I take these positions? I 
don’t know.’ (1996, p. 30) 
16 Thanks to an anonymous referee for the suggestion that I frame this portion of my discussion as a discussion of 
error theories. 
17 Actually, this is an oversimplification: according to UP, I can rationally believe that my peer’s attitude toward P is 
rational if I don’t know my own view about P. So it is strictly speaking false that UP says that I can never believe 
that the view of a peer is rational, while retaining my own view. 
18 Suppose that you and I hold incompatible doxastic attitudes on the basis of the same evidence, that I believe that 
your view is irrational, and that as a result of this belief, I redouble my efforts to see how you arrived at your view. 
If my motivation for redoubling my efforts is to learn from your perspective on the issue, all is well and good – I am 
treating you respectfully, not jerkily. On the other hand, if my motivation for redoubling my efforts is to correct you 
or help you amend (what I perceive as) your irrational ways, one might think that I’m still failing to treat you as an 
epistemic peer – and hence still being a jerk. My own intuition is that it is possible to respectfully engage in dialogue 
with someone, and even to learn from them, even while being motivated by a desire to correct them. 
19 The arbitrariness objection is most striking when it is applied to a case in which a permissivist holds that E 
rationalizes both belief in P and belief in not-P (a position White calls ‘extreme permissivism’). However, its force 
is not diminished in cases where the permissivism is understood in credal terms. If I believe, for example, that 
credences of .6 and .8 in P are both rational on E, it’s still hard to see what reasons I could have for choosing a 
credence of .6 rather than a credence of .8. In what follows, I discuss the more extreme example where E licenses 
belief in P and belief in not-P, but as far as I can see, nothing much turns on this. 
20 Weisberg’s discussion of the arbitrariness objection (in his terminology, the instability problem) comports with this 
reading of the objection (forthcoming). Weisberg writes that permissive epistemologies ‘allow us to embrace one set 
of beliefs while simultaneously acknowledging that an alternative view is just as good.’ He goes on to say that 
‘acknowledging that a second perspective is equally legitimate threatens our commitment to the first.’ Having made 
the judgment that a belief that P is ‘just as good’ as a belief that not-P, we can’t rationally favour one over the other.  
Simpson (2017), in his paper-length analysis of the arbitrariness objection, also pinpoints the problematic nature of 
judging two doxastic attitudes to be equally rational and choosing just one: ‘If you say DA1 and DA2 are both rationally 
permissible doxastic attitudes to hold towards P given E, it’s hard to see what reasons you could have – other than 
arbitrary reasons, like what’s more fun to believe – for singling out either of these as your belief.’  
Finally, Greco and Hedden (2016) argue that judging that P is rational on E and concurrently judging that not-P is 
rational on E is inconsistent. They argue for this conclusion on the basis of a principle they endorse, Deference. 
Deference says that if an agent S1 judges that S2’s belief that P is rational, and that S1 does not have any relevant 
evidence that S2 lacks, then S1 defers to S2’s belief that P (p. 373). (They take deferring to someone else’s belief to 
involve adopting that belief as one’s own rather than ‘merely respecting it or allowing it to govern a group’s decision.’) 
If we grant that Deference is true, then judging that more than one doxastic attitude towards P is rational given E will 
result in inconsistent attitudes.  
21 Note the resemblance of AAR to Cohen’s Doxastic Uniqueness principle. Doxastic Uniqueness states that ‘a 
subject cannot rationally believe there are two (or more) rational credences for [some hypothesis] H on [some body 
of evidence] E, while rationally holding either’ (Cohen 2013, p. 102). Cohen uses Doxastic Uniqueness to defend a 
version of the Equal Weight view in the literature on disagreement. I discuss the similarities and differences between 
conciliationist views of peer disagreement my own in greater detail in §5. 
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22 This reasoning would fail to convince permissivists such as Schoenfield who, as already noted, deny that AAR 
expresses a genuine requirement of rationality. For Schoenfield, judgments that attitudes other than your own are 
equally rational can themselves be perfectly rational. Permissivists who take this line can resist the arbitrariness 
argument simply by rejecting the first premise. But for others who are inclined to accept AAR as a requirement of 
rationality, UP presents itself as another way to resist the arbitrariness argument, as I will go on to show. 
23 See Christensen (2014) as an example of someone who rejects this premise.  
24 There are different explanations on offer as to why making salient alternative possibilities to P destroys my 
knowledge of P (DeRose 2005; Hawthorne 2003; Nagel 2010, 2011; Williamson 2005). But there is broad agreement 
that one’s ignorance of alternative possibilities allows us to preserve our knowledge.  
25 Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this as an alternative possible motivation for White’s claim. 
26 On the other hand, if there are cases in which a subject may be aware of P without adopting any doxastic attitude 
towards P, perhaps this response can be made to work. 
27 I will remain neutral on the question of what counts as good evidence that a case is permissive. Answering that 
question would involve articulating the defining characteristics of a permissive case, and I don’t have space to tackle 
that question here. Different theories have been proposed, e.g.: a case is permissive if the participants have different 
but equally rational weightings of the Jamesian goals of pursuing truth and avoiding error (Kelly 2013); a case is 
permissive if both participants have cognitive abilities with comparable track-records in terms of accuracy (Simpson 
2017); a case of permissive if both participants use rational methods for processing their evidence (Weisberg, 
forthcoming); a case is permissive if both participants hold rational but different epistemic standards (Schoenfield, 
2014).  
28 Again, compare Kelly: ‘Whether we find the possibility of disagreement intellectually threatening…will and 
should ultimately depend on our considered judgments about how rational the merely possible dissenters might be 
in so dissenting’ (2005, p. 181). 
29 I would like to thank John Bunke, Catherine Hundleby, Jennifer Nagel, Manish Oza, Gurpreet Rattan, Benjamin 
Wald, Jonathan Weisberg, and Jessica Wright for helpful discussion of previous versions of this paper. Thanks also 
to audience members at the meeting of the Canadian Philosophical Association in Montreal, audience members at 
Grad Forum at the University of Toronto, and two anonymous referees, for many helpful comments and questions. 
Finally, I acknowledge the support of the Canadian Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) for 
providing funding for this research. 
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